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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the impact of changes in scal policy regime on
the yield curve. In particular, we di¤erentiate between yield curve responses
under active and passive scal policy regimes (according to the terminology of
Leeper 1991). Analyzing US data in the period 1965-2010, we nd a statis-
tically signicant impact of scal policy only for the active policy regime. A
one-percentage-point shock in the primary decit leads typically to a contempo-
raneous increase in long-term yields of about 10 basis points, and even stronger
cumulative e¤ects. No signicant impact of decits on yields is found in the
passive scal policy regime.
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1 Introduction
As part of the policy response to the ongoing nancial crisis (2008-2010), scal policy turned
active again in a large number of developed countries. By turning active, scal policy was
re-directed towards economic stabilization, instead of debt stabilization, thereby supporting
and reinforcing the expansionary stance of monetary policy. While the expansionary impact
of monetary policy is generally accepted, there is less consensus concerning the impact of
scal policy. Much of the debate centers around the potential interest rate impact of scal
expansions. According to standard IS-LM reasoning, scal stimuli lead to signicant in-
crease in aggregate demand which, if not met with appropriate monetary expansions, leads
to increases in long-term rates and some degree of crowding out of private investment. How-
ever, this view has been challenged both on theoretical and empirical grounds. First, various
theoretical models based on Ricardian equivalence predict insignicant or quantitatively neg-
ligible e¤ects on aggregate demand (increased decits induce higher private savings, limiting
the impact on interest rates). Second, the empirical studies on crowding out have been in
general inconclusive, with ndings often sensitive to the specic type of statistical methods.
In particular, studies employing standard time series methods have not been able to identify
statistically signicant e¤ects (e.g. Evans (1985), Evans (1987), Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
or Perotti (2005)); while some supportive evidence has been found by either focussing on
announcement e¤ects (e.g. Wachtel and Young (1987), Kitchen (1996) or Elmendorf (1993))
or on larger scal expansions and contractions (e.g. Ardagna (2009)).
The main goal of this paper is to assess empirically the impact of scal policy on the yield
curve, conditioning on the scal policy regime. Specically, we distinguish between active
and passive policy regimes (see Leeper (1991)). The passive scal policy regime is identied
by scal policy consistent with a non-accelerating, stabilizing debt-to-gdp dynamics, while
in the active policy regime, scal policy is set in function of generating certain macroeco-
nomic e¤ects, independently of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Conditioning on the scal policy
regime is important and may facilitate the statistical identication of potential crowding
out e¤ects for three reasons. First, scal policy regimes have been empirically identied for
the US economy: Favero and Monacelli (2005), using a Markov switching framework, nd
evidence of signicant regime switches in US scal policy over the period 1960-2002. Second,
by di¤erentiating between active and passive policy regimes, we may better identify shocks
to expected future decits. As discussed by Gale and Orszag (2002), anticipated (next to
current) decits play a crucial role in the occurrence of crowding out e¤ects. This argu-
mentation follows Feldstein (1986) in concluding that anticipated and persistent increases
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in decits are likely to have more signicant impact on long-term rates through larger ex-
pectations and risk premium e¤ects. By di¤erentiating between active and passive policy,
we explicitly separate regimes with substantial di¤erences in anticipated future decits. In
particular, decits are expected to increase much more during the active than during the
passive scal policy regime. Finally, it has been shown that signicant impact of the scal
decits on yields is found for large structural changes in scal policy. Large expansions
or contractions in decits are typically found to generate signicant e¤ects on long-term
yields. For instance, Ardagna (2009) or Kiani (2009), focussing on larger scal expansions
and contractions across a set of OECD countries, observe strong and signicant yield curve
e¤ects. Switches between policy regimes are likely to generate such structural changes in the
(anticipated) scal policy stance.
The above arguments suggest substantial di¤erences in the impact of decits across policy
regimes. In this paper, we assess the regime-dependent impact of decits on yields for
the US. We proceed in two steps. First, following Favero and Monacelli (2005), we use a
standard Markov switching framework to identify active and passive policy regimes. Fiscal
policy regimes are identied through the scal policy rules, where the policy rule of the
passive regime is consistent with debt stabilization. The empirical results from our sample
corroborate the ndings of Favero and Monacelli (2005): we identify an active and a passive
regime with clear and relatively frequent shifts between active and passive policies. Second,
conditional on the policy regime, we assess the impact of scal policy on interest rates
by estimating the yield curve responses to scal decit changes. By estimating the price
impact across maturities, we are able to di¤erentiate between the impact on short-term and
long-term interest rates in each of the policy regimes. The empirical analysis leads to the
following conclusions. First, we nd statistically signicant e¤ects in the active policy regime
(even after controlling for other yield curve determinants) with contemporaneous increases
of about ten basis points per percentage point increase in the primary decit and much
larger cumulative dynamic e¤ects. Second, no signicant impact is found under the passive
scal policy regime. Third, in the active regime, we observe cross-sectional di¤erences in the
impact of decits on yields. In particular, larger price impacts are found at the longer end
of the maturity spectrum while for shorter maturities we do not nd strong price e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we dene the active
and the passive scal policy regime, set out the Markov-switching model used to identify the
regimes and discuss the occurrence of active and passive regimes. Subsequently, in Section 3,
we estimate the price impact of primary decit shocks on the yield curve. Both unconditional
and conditional (on the policy regime) results are presented. Finally, Section 4 concludes by
2
summarizing the main ndings.
2 Policy Regimes
2.1 Active and passive scal policy rules
We follow the literature on scal policy feedback rules in describing scal policy. The policy
feedback rule decomposes scal policy decisions, represented by the primary decit (relative
to gdp), dt, into three components: the previous decit (modeling inertia of scal policy),
dt 1; the target decit, dt, and an idiosyncratic scal policy shock, "t: Formally, the scal
policy rule is presented as follows:
dt = (st)dt 1 + (1  (st)) dt + "t(st);
dt = c(st) + (st)yt + (st)d
S
t ;
(1)
where the target decit consists of a cyclically adjusted target decit, dSt , and a term allowing
for the counter-cyclical component of scal policy, (st)yt; assumed proportional to the
output gap. Importantly, we allow for regime dependence in the policy rule. The regime
dependence follows from the dependence of the parameters in the policy rule on the regime
variable st = f1; 2g : The regime variable st is assumed to follow the rst-order Markov
process with transition matrix P; whose element is pij = Pr [st = i; st 1 = j] :
P =
"
p 1  q
1  p q
#
: (2)
We follow Favero and Monacelli (2005) in identifying passive scal policy through the im-
plications for the debt dynamics, as described by the policy rule. Specically, the passive
scal policy regime is identied through a feedback rule consistent with the implicit debt-
stabilization motive. As is well known, the implied (cyclically adjusted) decit consistent
with debt stabilization can be derived from the debt accumulation equation:
bt =
(1 + idt )
(1 + gt)
bt 1 + dt; (3)
where bt denotes the debt-to-gdp ratio, idt the interest rate paid on government debt and
gt the growth rate of nominal gdp. Stabilizing the debt ratio (bt = bt 1), then, implies the
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following target primary decit:
dSt =
gt   idt
(1 + gt)
bt 1: (4)
Stabilization of the debt-to-gdp ratio, thus, requires primary surpluses (in the case where the
implied interest rate exceeds the nominal growth rate, i.e. id > g) or restricted decits (in
the case where the nominal growth rate of gdp exceeds the implied interest rate, i.e. id < g).
We dene the scal policy as passive if it is consistent with debt stabilization, i.e. if the
feedback rule in equation (1) is in the long run consistent with the target primary decit,
dSt :
j(st)j < 1; c(st) = 0; (st) = 1: (5)
2.2 Estimating policy rules
We assess the occurrence of active and passive policy in the US by estimating the Markov
switching model discussed in the previous section. First, we discuss data issues and, subse-
quently, we present the estimation results.
2.2.1 Data
The data set consists of US data spanning the period 1965Q2 till 2009Q4. The NIPA tables
(i.e. NIPA table 3.2) were used to collect information on primary decits (obtained as
government expenditures net of interest rate payments minus government revenues). As a
result, we obtain a primary scal decit series with positive (negative) values referring to
decits (surpluses). Total debt is obtained from the FRED data set. We also collect data on
debt held privately (i.e. series FDHBPIN).1 Finally, we use the gdp deator as base series to
form ination, take seasonally adjusted gdp and CBO-based estimates of the output gap to
compute, respectively, growth rates and output gaps. We compute the stabilizing primary
decit in two steps by using an HP smoothed version of the decit implied by equation (4).2
Insert Figure 1
Figure 1 Panel (a) presents the actual and the target (stabilizing) primary decit. As can
be observed, the actual decit displays substantial time variation, mostly centered around
the stabilizing primary decit. The stabilizing primary decit is in line with the estimates
1Note that we also estimated models where total debt was used. The main ndings of the paper are
robust to the choice of type of debt.
2We use a relatively high value for  = 1600 in the HP lter so as to generate a relatively smooth trend
part for the target decit.
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provided by Favero and Monacelli (2005). It is most often negative implying that, in general,
primary surpluses are required to stabilize the debt-to-gdp ratio. The latter conclusion
derives from the fact that the average interest paid on government debt exceeds the growth
rate of nominal gdp (see equation (4)). However, note that before 1980 (i.e. 1965-1979),
the stabilizing primary decit is positive, indicating that the growth rate of nominal gdp
exceeded the average interest rate on government debt. Panel (b) displays the scatter plot
of the actual and stabilizing primary decit and illustrates their substantial di¤erences.
Absence of a strong link between the two suggests that, besides debt stabilization, other
factors drive actual scal policy. Panels (c) and (d) display the (privately held) debt-to-gdp
dynamics and the relation between actual primary decit and debt-to-gdp ratio, respectively.
In particular, Panel (d) illustrates the link between primary decit and debt-to-gdp level.
Overall, and in line with Bohn (1998), we observe a dominating negative relation between
primary decits and debt levels. This negative correlation is suggesting that US scal policy
has been overall passive. Smaller primary decits (and often higher primary surpluses) are
observed on average for higher debt-to-gdp ratios. Note, however, that also a substantial
amount of outliers (high primary decits) are observed, suggesting the appearance of active
scal policy over specic and brief periods.
2.2.2 Results
Table 1 contains the estimation results for alternative specications of the scal policy rule.
Two sets of models were estimated. First, Panel A presents regression results deriving from
the assumption of a regime-independent (linear) policy rule. Panel B contains the estimation
results obtained from an unrestricted, two regime, Markov-switching model. Finally, Panels
C and D impose the identication restrictions for a passive policy regime (on regime st = 1),
i.e. imposes the restrictions j(st = 1)j < 1; c(st = 1) = 0; (st = 1) = 1: The results in
Table 1 highlight several conclusions.
Insert Table 1 and Figure 2
First, overall, US scal policy can be modeled in terms of simple policy rules. Specically,
all models in Table 1 explaining the primary decit by means of three variables (lagged decit,
output gap and stabilizing primary decit) perform reasonably well in replicating observed
primary decits. Typically, the rules explain about 90 percent of the variation in the actual
observed primary decits and the estimated signs are generally in line with theory.
Second, there is clear evidence that scal policy (i.e. primary decits) are regime-
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dependent: all three versions of the Markov switching representation outperform the lin-
ear specication of the scal policy rule in terms of R-square, log-likelihood and BIC. The
univocal preference across model specication tests in favor of the Markov switching repre-
sentation can be seen as strong statistical support for the presence of scal policy regime
shifts.
Third, analysis of the Markov switching representation clearly identies a passive and
an active scal policy regime, respectively regime st = 1 and st = 2. Active scal policy is
identied as a policy regime characterized by (i) relatively low policy inertia (st = 2) = 0:54,
(ii) an explosive primary decit dynamics, inconsistent with a debt-stabilization goal (the
parameter on the stabilizing primary decit is negative (1   (st = 2))(st = 2) =  0:41)
and (iii) substantial scal policy shocks, 2(st = 2) = 0:0094. The passive policy rule, on
the contrary, is characterized by (i) substantial inertia, (st = 1) = 0:82, (ii) a primary
decit consistent with debt stabilization, (1  (st = 1))(st = 1) = 0:11) and (iii) relatively
small policy shocks, 2(st = 1) = 0:000014. To formally test for the passivity of Regime
1, we estimated two additional versions of the Markov switching model: one imposing the
one-to-one (long-run) relation between the actual and the debt stabilizing decit ((st =
1) = 1) and one imposing all identication restrictions for passivity: (st = 1) = 1 and
c(st = 1) = 0: Both types of restrictions are not statistically rejected as indicated by the
respective loglikelihood ratio tests, i.e. 1.66 (p-value 0.8) and 3.66 (p-value 0.84). Additional
supportive evidence is provided by the BIC criterion, clearly identifying the model imposing
the passive policy restrictions as the statistically superior representation.
Finally, Figure 2 depicts the regime probabilities and identies the active and passive
scal policy periods. As can be observed and in line with previous studies, we nd that
scal policy has been predominantly passive. Nevertheless, we observe recurrent periods
characterized by active scal policy. The estimated probabilities suggest expected duration
of the passive and active scal policy regime of, respectively, about 28 and 6 quarters.
The identied periods of active scal policy are in line with other studies. In particular,
we obtain similar periods of active policy as Favero and Monacelli (2005), using a sample
up to 2002, and additionally identify the current nancial crisis as a new episode of scal
activism. These identied active regimes have clear connections to specic periods in US
politics characterized by activism. The short-lived 74-75 activist period can be linked to the
scal policy program of the Carter administration, while the Bush administration (allowing
for three successive tax cuts in 2001, 2002 and 2003) is identied as an active period by
the Markov switching model (2001-2005). Finally, the Markov switching model dates the
beginning of the current active period around mid 2008, concurring with the beginning of
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the crisis (with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers).
3 Fiscal activism and the cost of debt nancing
Statistical analysis of the impact of scal policy on interest rates has been inconclusive so
far. In particular, reported estimates of the interest rate sensitivity to primary decits (i.e.
crowding out e¤ects) di¤er signicantly across studies, ranging from signicantly positive
to insignicant or even negative values. The lack of conformity in empirical ndings can
be partially explained by alternative econometric methods. As discussed in e.g. Favero
and Giglio (2006), issues related to identication, regime-dependence and debt maturity can
explain the wide range of often contradictory ndings. Analysis based on standard linear
regression techniques, projecting interest rates of various maturities on scal decit, yields
small and often insignicant e¤ects. This could be interpreted as evidence against a strong
pattern in the bivariate correlation of interest rates and decits.3 Alternatively, the failure
to nd signicant e¤ects could be explained by the lack of identication arising from the
di¢ culty to isolate the scal policy e¤ect on yields. In particular, business cycle develop-
ments may hamper the identication of the scal policy e¤ect: scal decits typically move
countercyclically while interest rates move procyclically. To overcome these identication
issues, alternative identication techniques have been proposed. Studies analyzing the price
impact of announcements of changes in scal policy (e.g. Wachtel and Young (1987), Kitchen
(1996), Calomiris et al. (2003) or Laubach (2009)) or focussing on the price impact of large
changes in decits (changes in regimes), e.g. Ardagna (2009) or Kiani (2009), have typically
reported signicant price (interest) impact of scal decits.
In this paper, we use an alternative approach to identifying price impact by focussing on
periods of active scal policy. Periods of scal activism are arguably well-suited to identify
the price impact of scal decits because of the implied expectations and risk premium e¤ects.
Following Feldstein (1986), it can be argued that expected future decits have stronger price
impact than current decits (due to the expectations and the risk premium e¤ects). By
focussing on periods of scal activism, we reinforce expectations and risk premium e¤ects
and hence facilitate the identication of the price impact of scal policy.4
The impact of scal decits (and the di¤erentiation between active and passive price
e¤ects) is measured across the maturity spectrum of the yield curve. To this end, we use a
3Examples of empirical studies failing to detect strong/signicant impact of scal decit (shocks) on
yields include Evans and Marshall (2002) and Miller and Russek (1996).
4Active scal policy is often associated with persistently increasing debt-to-gdp ratios.
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standard regression model for the (zero-coupon) yield on US government debt instruments
with maturity m; it(m) :
it(m) = c+ iit 1(m) + ( + 
AI(st))dt + yyt + t: (6)
The regression model includes the standard macroeconomic determinants of the yield curve:
i.e. lagged yields it 1(m), ination t, the output gap, yt; and additionally allows for an
impact of the primary decit dt. Moreover, we di¤erentiate between the price impact of
decits in active and passive policy regimes by introducing an additional variable in the
active policy regime, I(st)dt: The indicator function I(st) takes on a value of 1 during
periods of scal activism (st = 2) and zero in the passive regime (st = 1). The estimated
price impact of passive scal policy is therefore given by  while under active scal policy
the total e¤ect of decits is given by  + A:
Insert Table 2
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates for equation (6) for yields (on zero coupon bonds)
with maturities 1, 3, 5 and 10 years. In line with the literature, we nd (i) strong inertia in
yield dynamics ( ranges from 0.94 to 0.97), (ii) signicant and positive impact of ination
on yields, and, (iii) the procyclicality of yields measured by the positive impact of the
output gap. Importantly, note that we do not nd signicant price impact of decits during
the passive policy regime. In general, we observe a statistically insignicant negative price
impact in the passive regime. Consequently and against the background that the passive
scal policy regime is the most frequent policy regime, our ndings concur with the view
that scal policy does not signicantly impact on the yield curve. Note that this nding
holds across the maturity spectrum. However, we do nd statistically signicant crowding
out e¤ects for the active policy regime. While for short maturities we obtain insignicant
parameters, A; we observe signicant price impact on the longer end of the yield curve
(i.e. the ve and ten year maturities). In particular, the impact parameter for the 10
year maturity is estimated around 0.10, which identies the (instantaneous) long-term yield
impact of a switch from passive to active scal policy at 10 basis points per percentage point
increase in the primary decit.
Insert Figure 3
To assess the economic signicance of the estimation, we analyze the impact on the yield
curve of a switch from passive to active scal policy. To this end, we use the Markov switching
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model to estimate the yield curve impact of a switch from passive to active policy for di¤erent
horizons.5 Keeping in mind that the average duration of the active regime (implied by the
Markov switching model) is estimated around six quarters, we simulate the impact on the
yield curve over six quarters. Figure 3 illustrates the price impact of the switch from passive
to active policy for di¤erent horizons by tracking the di¤erence between yields under the
active and the passive regime. We observe initially a small e¤ect of about 10 basis points,
with the initial impact increasing in maturity, indicating that with the switch from passive
to active policy, yields only increase marginally (about 10 basis points for the 10 year yield).
Over time, however, the initial impact is amplied, growing steadily to an overall e¤ect of
about 50 basis points after 6 quarters.6 Clearly, these dynamic e¤ects establish the economic
signicance of scal decits under scal activism.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze empirically the impact of scal policy on the yield curve. Unlike
standard statistical procedures used in the literature, we allow for regime switches in the
scal policy stance (as documented by Favero and Monacelli (2005)). Subsequently, we
di¤erentiate between the impact on yields of scal policy in the active and passive policy
modes. In particular, we use the active policy regime to identify crowding out e¤ects.
The ndings can be summarized as follows. First, using a standard two-state Markov
switching model, we nd strong evidence of regime switches in the scal policy stance in
the US. Statistical testing, moreover, does not reject the interpretation of policy regimes as
active and passive. While the passive regime dominates over the 1965-2010 period, there are
clear indications of switches towards more active scal policies. Second, we nd evidence of
a price impact of scal policy, as measured by primary decits, in the active policy regime.
The price impact is especially pronounced at the longer end of the maturity spectrum. More
specically, a switch from a passive to an active policy regime generates an instantaneous
increase of ten basis points per percentage point decit, increasing with the duration of the
active scal policy stance. Finally, no signicant price e¤ects of scal policy are observed
in the passive policy regime. The latter two points corroborate the Feldstein (1986) thesis
stating that expectations of future expected decits, and not so much current decits, drive
5We start the simulation from steady state. The steady state is measured by the yield implied by the
empirical average of the determinants ; y while assuming a primary decit of 1 percentage point.
6This impact would increase as long as the active scal policy regime would remain in place (with a limit
of about 2.5 percent). However, the probability of scal policy remaining active over protracted periods of
time is negligibly small in this Markov setting.
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the impact of scal policy on the yield curve.
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Table 2: Yield curve impact of active and passive fiscal policy
c    y 
A R2
Yield maturity: 1 year
Estimate -0.0016 0.946 -0.0114 0.1115 0.0784 0.061 0.94
Std.err. (0.0018) (0.0318) (0.0615) (0.0315) (0.0400) (0.0701)
Yield maturity: 3 years
Estimate -0.002 0.9647 -0.0227 0.0956 0.0546 0.0883 0.95
Std.err. (0.0018) (0.0277) (0.0498) (0.0247) (0.0345) (0.0597)
Yield maturity: 5 years
Estimate -0.0019 0.9697 -0.0309 0.0873 0.0421 0.096 0.95
Std.err. (0.0017) (0.026) (0.0437) (0.0216) (0.0315) (0.0538)
Yield maturity: 10 years
Estimate -0.0017 0.9743 -0.0341 0.0774 0.0285 0.095 0.96
Std.err. (0.0016) (0.0230) (0.0359) (0.0176) (0.0269) (0.0453)
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